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ABSTRACT: In the early 1960s, Ursula Le Guin wrote ‘The Masters’, a short novel that 
offers a sharp contrast to the ‘maths for all’ discourse of contemporary mathematics 
education reforms. Le Guin writes of a world – Edun – where ‘mathematical prohibition’ 
is law. Mathematical reason is banned for all people by the Priests of Edun, and failure to 
obey is punishable by death. Despite the threat of this totalitarian anti-math regime, some 
citizens create a collective heterotopia in which they practice mathematics in secret. Le 
Guin’s story is an opportunity to conduct a thought experiment: ‘what if maths became 
forbidden?’ This ‘what if’ experiment (Haraway 2016) allows us to consider how 
statements such as ‘maths for all’ or ‘no to maths’ are grounded in rationalisations that 
construe mathematical subjectivity as a determined actor for citizen agency in 
contemporary societies. The paper suggests that we need to move beyond a ‘maths for 
all’ or ‘no to maths’ dichotomy by interrogating how they both operate as ‘states of 
exception’ around politics of fear producing in/exclusions.  
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I. The Masters: Life at the threshold of Mathematical Prohibition 
“The smoke was thick now, hiding the flames and the figure among them. But Ganil could 
hear his voice, not soft now, loud, very loud. He heard it, he forced himself to hear it, but at 
the same time he listened in his spirit to a steady voice, soft, continuing: ‘What is the Sun? 
Why does it cross the sky? […] Do you see how I need your numbers? […] For XII, write 
12 […] This is also a figure, a figure for Nothing’” 
- Ursula Le Guin, The Masters, p. 58: Last words by Mede, Ganil’s friend, as he dies. 
In her début science fiction story, ‘The Masters’, Ursula Le Guin tells the story of 
Edun; a dystopia in which practicing mathematics is forbidden. The story was originally 
published in the American science fiction magazine Fantastic and was recently adapted to 
the opera by Peter Foley and Kate Chisholm under the name Hidden Sky.2 Le Guin 
invites her readers to follow Ganil, a young mathematician, who seeks shelter by 
becoming a Master at Edun. In Edun, sun and light have become scarce resources in the 
face of severe environmental decay. In this world of general crisis, the Priests have 
forbidden Masters, apprentices and the mass population from practicing mathematics. 
Only the Priests may practice mathematics, and the lay people are constrained to a 
common-sense life, absent of the burden of mathematical contemplation. Failure to obey 
is punishable by death. This ‘mathematics prohibition’ serves to tacitly construct maths 
as the cause for Edun’s environmental crisis.  
In order to become a Master in a Lodge, Ganil had to take an Oath. The Oath is a 
promise to never reveal the rites and mysteries of the Lodge; to live, work and think well; 
to avoid all heresies; to betray all neuromancers to the Courts of College; to obey the 
High Masters and Priests and to deny the culture of his forefathers. A crucial part of the 
Oath is to swear to live free of the curse of mathematical reason.  Although it was never 
explicitly said, mathematical reason was held responsible for all perils experienced at 
Edun. As such, being a Master in the polis of Edun means surrendering to a life of 
mathematical repression. Ganil had to furthermore denounce his will to gain knowledge, 
                                                
 
 
2 The Hidden Sky is an award winning musical theatre opera adaptation of the novel The Masters authored by Ursula Le Guin in 1963. 
Kate Chisholm is the playwriter and Peter Foley the composer and director. The opera has been on stage three times from 2000 to 
2010. More details can be found here: http://www.hellagoodmusic.com/works/theater/hidden_sky.htm 
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his competence to reason about mechanical or natural phenomena, and even his skills to 
invent or construct new ideas, tools, models, artefacts, apparatuses or networks.   
In this paper, I employ Agamben’s theorizing about states of exception – or 
situations in which crisis justifies elites’ transgression of the rule of law – toward an 
analysis of mathematics education reform discourse. In the case of Edun, severe 
environmental crisis is leveraged by elites to introduce mathematical prohibition as an 
urgent need (Agamben 1998). By this law, the individual accused of maths heresy runs 
the risk of losing not only one’s bios (i.e. life as citizen) but even one’s own zoê (i.e. 
biological life). Agamben’s (1998) theory of states of exception is an expansion of 
Foucault’s notions of biopower, as diverse modern techniques that achieve to regulate, 
discipline and control populations by subjugating the human body. Foucault provided 
examples of biopower that include disciplinary strategies and punishment mechanisms 
enforced within institutional sites such as the prison, the family or the school. In modern 
times, biopolitics has been increasingly geared towards regulation of the mass population 
through the concept of security. As such, technologies of self-governance are geared to 
the production and particularly the protection of the viable or normal citizen.  
Foucault (1973/2003) argues how biopower unfolds as a ’discourse of security’, 
establishing binaries between ’us’ and ’them’ or between the ’normal’ (i.e. legitimate 
citizens) who deserve to live and the ’abnormal’ (i.e. undisciplined or illegal citizens) 
who are expendable. Agamben argues that biopower is not an orientation of modern 
politics, but the very essence of politics. Drawing from Aristotle’s discussion of 
citizenship or life in the polis as consisting of bios and zoê, Agamben argues that the 
distinction between bios (i.e. the political life of the citizen) and zoê (i.e. biological life) 
is constituted by a simultaneous exclusion and inclusion. Ultimately this in/exclusion 
process can create not only marginalised or subaltern subjects, but also the ‘homo sacer’; 
a person who, as offender, loses the right to citizenship and is condemned to live outside 
the polis without social and legal status. In contrast to the life of the citizen (i.e. bios), the 
’homo sacer’ exists only as bare life (i.e. zoê) out of the juridical order (ibid., p. 102). 
Ursula Le Guin in her novel narrates how the mathematical subject risks of becoming a 
‘homo sacer’ in Edun and, thus, ceasing to be citizen. 
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Agamben argues that in current ’societies of control’ we must also turn attention 
to the ‘homo sacer’ as a political subject. In Edun, the political subjectivity of homo sacer 
is crudely epitomized in the case of Mede, Ganil’s friend. Finally, Ganil is found guilty of 
doing mathematics, arrested, sentenced to death and executed − losing both bios and zoê. 
However, despite the risk of death, some still opt toward practicing mathematics in 
secrecy as a collective heterotopia in the sense of developing a non-hegemonic physical 
or mental space where otherness is experienced as both utopia and dystopia (Foucault 
1986).  
At this point, one might wonder what might be the relevance of Le Guin’s story in 
relation to current discussions of ‘maths for all’ or ‘no to maths’ in the field of 
mathematics education? First, one needs to account how certain policies worldwide 
attempt to cure mathematics education, urging reforms that would secure access to 
‘maths for all’ through curricular changes, international or national assessment practices, 
teacher education programs, as well as, didactic and pedagogical products. Such cultural 
renewal of mathematics education claims to provide refined micro-contexts such as real-
world simulations, models, or word-problems where the ‘use-value’ of mathematics is 
experienced as competences ‘transfer’ across school and workplace rationalised around 
the ‘importance’ of mathematics in the everyday. Against this hegemonic imperative, 
some researchers have worked to denote its fictional status arguing how mathematical 
activity creates a ‘cynical distance’ from a real-life that remains complex and impossible 
to grasp in its totality (Lundin 2011, Pais 2011, Straehler-Pohl 2017, Kollosche 2017). As 
such, the idea of mathematics as an important constituent of everyday activities is 
interrogated, and at the same time, the use-value ideology of mathematics as disavowing 
its part in the politico-economic structures of capitalism becomes critiqued. They ask 
mathematics educators to ‘stop acting’ as if mathematics is crucially important and, 
instead, say ‘no’.  
Although some mathematics education researchers embrace the ‘no to maths’ as a 
way to question the hegemonic status of a ‘maths for all’ fiction, such a move runs the 
risk of creating a bipolar dichotomy amongst the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to maths claims. It 
advances a view on mathematics as a disappearing commodity and, at the same time, 
obscures from conceiving mathematics’ potentiality otherwise. ‘The Masters’ helps 
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reconsider ‘maths for all’ and ‘no to maths’ within our current state of affairs by asking 
us to imagine a state where mathematics is outlawed for all citizens. This state does not 
only marginalise the mathematically able body but throws it out of its borders. Reading 
this novel alongside Agamben’s view of the life of citizen as bios and zoê reveals that 
both ‘yes’ and ‘no to maths’ discourses may run the risk of producing a ‘state of 
exception’ based on politics of fear. In this paper, Le Guin’s story ‘The Masters’ is 
explored as a ‘what if’ laboratory (Haraway 2016) where a contemplative space to 
interrogate the ‘dis|appearing mathematics’ can be created. I read the story in companion 
with Giorgio Agamben, Donna Haraway, Michael Bakhtin, Hannah Arendt and Alfred 
Whitehead, whilst keeping in mind prevailing discourses in mathematics education 
around the turbulent times of the 60s. In doing so, I have attempted to avoid a potential 
trap amongst a ‘maths for all’ and ‘no to maths’ dichotomy.  
This paper is organised in five sections, including the introduction. The second 
section discusses the dis|appearing of mathematics as liberating the citizens of Edun from 
reason, and provides a historiography of the ‘no to math’ discourses in post-Marxist 
social theory. Throughout the ‘no to math’ discourse, reason is discursively fabricated as 
a synonym to mathematical reason. In a similar vein, the crises of Edun are blamed on 
violent or immoral scientific or technological uses of reason. In the following two 
sections, the theories of Hannah Arendt and Alfred Whitehead are employed to explore 
how reason relates to common-sense about the human condition. In the final section, I 
return to bipolar discourses around the ‘maths for all’ and ‘no to maths’ and discuss how 
they both tend to produce the very same thing: fear. Albeit using different narratives, this 
fear is being discursively constructed in a direct relation to the life of citizens. 
II. A ‘what if…’ Laboratory 
What is the world that Le Guin narrates in ‘The Masters’ and why is mathematical 
subjectivity configured as a dangerous and heretic matter in the land of Edun? Why is 
‘mathematical prohibition’ utilized as a fear-inspiring law designating a ‘state of 
exception’? How could we, today, encounter Le Guin’s fiction along with contemporary 
discourses concerning the role of mathematics as biopower in the realm of mathematics 
education? Biopower in mathematics education is often geared towards construing the 
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desired citizen through a diversity of techniques that strive to discipline both students and 
teachers in the context of national and international comparative practices. What is 
mathematics today? What are the effects of considering mathematics as a formatting 
power in society, a way of reading, comprehending and emancipating the world, or, even, 
a system for fabricating the modern and neoliberal citizen? Is there room today for 
exploring a different kind of life with mathematics? The story of ‘The Masters’ could be 
read as a ‘what if…’ laboratory where relations around mathematics, life, ethics, reason, 
earth in decay, fear, violence, individual and state power are recurring themes. Here, we 
can re-consider and experiment with it in the light of a seemingly naïve, but, pressing 
question: ‘What if mathematics became forbidden for all?’  
The ’what if…’ lab crafted by Le Guin in the short story of ’The Masters’ does 
not provide easy answers to the above questions. Instead, through creating a dystopia (or 
utopia?) of a land that forbids mathematics, Le Guin invites us to step back from the 
’maths for all’ and ’no to maths’ poles and speculate the unknown, the unthinkable or, 
even, the undesirable. Haraway (2016) advocates the value of such narratives in our 
struggles to articulate the meaning and effects of discourses that threaten to become 
’regimes of truth’ or normalized parts of practice and policy too quickly. She says: ’We 
have the habit of mind of going for a theory of everything very fast’. Although Haraway 
affirms the necessity of abstractions, she argues how ’stories’ ground us into contigency 
and temporality. As an example, she refers to Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel ‘The Years 
of Rice and Salt’, which provides a thought experiment for some provocative questions: 
‘What if the great plagues had destroyed Europe? What if? What if this tiny little thing 
had been a little bit different? What might have been the consequences?’ Haraway argues 
that the importance of such a practice is not so much to support an imaginary of an 
alternative reality. Keeping a ‘what if’ approach is a way to keep things in play and a way 
to interrogate the promises and dangers of our times. Haraway notes, “It helps us to be 
not quite so hoodwinked by the notion of necessity. Including the necessity of tragic 
domination of the secular project of phallic man, which I think the Anthropocene is a 
name for (…) Humour, mixed with concern, anger, curiosity, and the imaginative 
insertion, every so often, of a ‘what if’.” (Haraway et al. 2016, p. 560) 
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Le Guin describes Edun as a state that not only takes distance from the ‘maths for 
all’ discourse, but actually forbids mathematical activity for the lay person. Why would 
the author want us to engage in such a trope? And how is this trope relevant for us today 
as we try to reconsider the subject of mathematics education in life and society? Although 
contingent to contemporary discourses of ‘maths for all’, Le Guin’s move does not seem 
accidental in her novel. Mikhael Bakhtin’s work on narratives centres the continuous 
presence of alterity; the encounter with the other as the inherent polyphony in every 
literary text. Discussing the meaning of any word as ‘the problem of the text’, Bakhtin 
(1986) explains eloquently that, rather than solely a conversation between the author and 
reader, “the word is a drama in which three characters participate” (p. xvii). The third 
participant, referred to by Bakhtin as the ‘specular subject’ or ‘superaddresee’ is always 
present alongside or in-between the author and reader. The speaking subject shapes an 
utterance not only according to the object of discourse (i.e. what the speaker talks or what 
the author writes about) and their immediate addressee (i.e. whom they are speaking or 
writing to), but also according to the ‘particular image in which they model the belief 
they will be understood, a belief that is a priori of all speech. Thus, each speaker authors 
an utterance not only with an audience-addressee, but a superaddressee in mind’ (Bakhtin 
1986: xvii). The superaddressee can be traced through hegemonic discourses operating as 
‘regimes of truths’ or ideological frames forming the specular subject. Le Guin’s specular 
subject is grounded in the 60s, when she wrote The Masters, and draws from discourses 
around modernity and science as ideological and political struggles.  
During the 60s, both modernity and science were under attack for the social and 
environmental horrors they created for nature and society. The ensuing ‘science-wars’ 
involved epistemological disputes about the ‘rational’ or ‘civilised’ in contrast to ‘wild’ 
or ‘savage’ minds3. In this context, mathematical reason, scientific rationality and 
                                                
 
 
3 Postmodernist standpoints concerning the nature of science, the role of science in society and its relation to natural have contributed 
to the development of what we refer today as ’science-wars’. The term ’science-wars’ refers to two interrelated debates around 
epistemological and ontological questions. The epistemological question refers to the nature of truth and the debate unfolds between 
’perspectivists’ or ’relativists’ and ’objectivists’. The ontological question problematises the nature of reality in controversial positions 
of constructivism and scientific realism. Postmodernists espouse, by and large, perspectivism, relativism and constructivism and reject 
scientific realism, whilst their oponnents endorse objectivism and scientific relativism whilst rejecting constructivism. It is often that 
postmodernists ascribe to Paul Feyerabend’s perspective of ’epistemological anarchism’ in which in science ’anything goes’, making 
it possible to endorse both ’reliable’ and ’mythical’ knowledge. A polemic and misleading critique comes from Gross and Levitt’s 
(1994) influential paper which describes postmodernists as anti-science Luddites, anarchists, academic lefts or the enemy within 
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technological determinism become interrogated as non-ethical governing practices that 
have produced horrors in modern society. At the same time, efforts to reform 
mathematics education – such as the ‘new-math’ or ‘modern’ mathematics – emerged. 
These reforms of the 60s still have effects on contemporary ‘maths for all’ discourses that 
invoke social justice, equity and democracy. Le Guin’s question of ‘What if mathematics 
became forbidden?’ appears to suggest a prediction of the future amidst the debates of the 
60s. Today, a conjecture of ‘mathematical prohibition’ may seem extremely provocative 
or even taboo. It might be correct to note that institutional practices or educational 
policies nowadays worldwide could not ‘dare’ to envisage a curriculum without 
mathematics. The establishment of mandatory primary and secondary school 
mathematics curricula was a response to societal and political demands for development, 
progress and security after the horrors and catastrophes of the first and second world 
wars. In this historical context, the discursive constitution of mathematically dis/abled 
subjects via national school based curricula and global assessment practices such as 
PISA, OECD or TIMMS has provided a ‘system of reason’ (Popkewitz 2009) that has 
served to in/exclude the un/desired citizen. It has also promoted a vision of equity as 
‘development’ via ‘the urgency for all to change’ and become citizens with rational 
agency: competent problem solvers or critical reasoners (Chronaki 2011, Pais & Valero 
2012, Yolçu 2017, Andrade-Molina 2017).  
Contemporary educational policy calls to ‘maths for all’ are interwoven with a 
complex net of discourses for the mastery of mathematics. Mathematical reason is taken 
as the ultimate objective, certain, neutral and transparent process in making meaning and 
producing ‘true’ or ‘real’ knowledge in an earth and society under decay. The 
universality of this discourse reads as if mathematics itself can be constituted responsible 
for the re/construction of a sustainable and democratic citizenship.4 In turn, this discourse 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
scientific circles. In Gross and Levitt’s view, postmodernists reject the very idea of science or scientific knowledge and do not accept 
any ’authority’ in science and/or describe science as dangerous. 
4 Indeed, ancient civilisations rooted in the geopolitics of what we call today Europe, Middle East or Asia, but also indigenous or first 
nation populations in the Canadian or American grounds have contributed to fundamental mathematical practices such as counting, 
measuring, reasoning, locating, sensing or constructing. Now, these practices have been reformulated into a specific version of 
mathematics that has travelled mainly (but not only) from the West to indigenous communities. This both reinforces and enforces a 
Eurocentric worldview as a culture-politics-science-life supremacy. Alongside religious catechism and missionary education, 
mathematics has become an essential colonising instrument strategically serving the empire, which, by and large, has ignored, 
diminished or ignored the contributions made by local cultures. 
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has been utilised as a disciplinary apparatus for governing not only the modern or 
neoliberal citizen, but also the indigenous or first nation colonised bodies and fe/male or 
dis/abled bodies (see Chronaki 2009 discussing feminist postcolonial critiques in school 
technoscience based on Spivak 1999, Harding 1998, Haraway 1997). Nowadays, most 
children and adults, if asked, would probably condemn compulsory math as it occurs in 
enclosures of learning or administration. Many studies report symptoms of children’s 
repeated failures in school mathematics and lack of motivation to engage with 
decontextualized tasks or ‘pseudo’ models of a complex reality. Furthermore, research 
continuously uncovers class stratifications and racialization of mathematical and 
unbridgeable gaps related to children’s backgrounds cultures, languages, genders, 
epistemologies and ontologies (Walkerdine 1998, Popkewitz 2004, Walshaw & Brown, 
2012). Despite continuous research attempts towards addressing the above through 
innovative didactic, pedagogic or curricular interventions and theorizing the persistence 
of affect such as fear, anger, frustration, boredom or indifference we, today, continue to 
confront school mathematics as ‘dead’ (Fasheh 1997) and mathematics education at a 
continuous state of ‘disorder’ (Straehler-Pohl, Pais & Bohlmann, 2017).  
We might claim an increased awareness of the futility or fallacy of remedying, 
correcting, renewing and readjusting school practices for a ‘maths for all’ (Lundin 2011). 
We can also urge each other to say ‘no’ to mathematics (Straehler-Pohl et al. 2017, Pais 
2017, Kollosche 2017). Such gestures, however, re-enforce the bipolar view of ‘maths for 
all’ and ‘no to maths’ that were present in the ‘science wars’ debates. Despite 
epistemological and political differences amongst current and old debates, they both tend 
to create a binary of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. This bipolar view traps us into an affective relation of 
loving and hating mathematics rather than allowing us to consider ramifications of each 
view. With Agamben, we realise how both the ‘yes’ and ‘no to maths’ gestures which are 
built on discourses of ‘fear’ and ‘fearism’ result into people placing their bios and zoê on 
danger. Specifically, the ‘yes’ promotes maths as a saviour for a desired citizenship (and 
loosing maths as the fear of not being a good citizen) and the ‘no’ frames mathematics as 
a danger (imagine the one who exhibits maths ability starting to develop a fear of being 
too rational). Either conceiving mathematics as the ‘saviour’ or as the ‘danger’ in society 
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produces certain kinds of citizenship based on mathematical subjectivities such as the 
able, the marginalised, the subaltern or even the homo-sacer. 
As such, Le Guin’s story may help us to interrogate the ‘yes’/’no’ dichotomy by 
examining the conjecture that, since mathematics has been responsible for state horrors 
and the earth’s decay by producing docile bodies, then forbidding mathematics to the 
mass population will resolve crisis and will secure the betterment of life. By playing out 
this conjecture in her novel, she experiments with the idea of an enforced liberation from 
reason. Of course, she could have opted to explore a different question, that of ‘What if 
mathematics itself was set free?’ But, by confronting the question of ‘what if 
mathematics is forbidden?’, she engages us with the potential dis|appearance of 
mathematics in society – an unspeakable discourse in mathematics education circles 
today. In the following sections, the dis|appearing of mathematics in Le Guin’s novel will 
be discussed in relation, first to liberating life from reason, second to life in-between 
power, reason and common-sense and lastly to reason as an anarchic ‘art of life’. 
III. Dis|appearing Mathematics: Or, liberating life from reason 
“And I swear never to teach the Mysteries of Machinery to any gentile. I swear this 
beneath the Sun.”   
-Ursula Le Guin, The Masters, p. 42: The Oath before entry to Edun 
Ganil enters Edun walking naked, alone, shivering in the cold wind and holding a 
torch in sheer darkness. The ‘voice’ of an old man in white hair guides his steps. “‘Now 
walk!’, ‘Walk forward’.” Ganil is petrified in the immense darkness where “the current of 
time had stopped”. He feels the pain in his body as he listens to a ‘voice’: “You lie in the 
Grave. You lie in the Grave of Knowledge. So lie your forefathers forever beneath the 
ashes of the fires of Hell”. Then, the same voice, pointing to Ganil’s torch, signals: “That 
is the Light of Human Reason. It guided you to the grave. Drop it!” and continues: “Now 
rise… rise from darkness and walk in the Light of Common Day” (Le Guin 1963, p. 41). 
From the very first scene in Le Guin’s story, Edun is pictured as the dystopic land 
where the end of mathematics becomes law in order to force a return to common-sense 
life. As Ganil tries to ender the state of Edun, described as the land of Common Day, he 
is obliged to prevent mathematical contemplation of any sort. In Edun, the deployment of 
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state power in the everyday involves the mandatory disappearance of all kinds of 
mathematical activity such as calculating, using models, constructing artefacts and 
describing or interpreting natural phenomena. Attempts to make ‘accurate’ 
approximations of measurement beyond the use of a comparing stick and even 
modifications of existent machinery is condemned as heresy. The use of Arab numerals 
and algorithms are seen as black arts. Work with Roman numbers is paradoxically 
permitted, which can be read as Le Guin’s efforts to remind us of the forceful battles 
amongst algorists and abacists in the years between 1100 and 1500. Historically, the 
Europeans in the Middle Ages who promoted the use of Roman numerals and the abacus 
for enacting calculations were called abacists, whilst those who advocated the use of the 
Hindu/Arabic numerals along with the use of algorithms were called algorists. The four 
hundred years from 1100 to 1500 witnessed the long, and sometimes bitter, struggles 
between the abacists and the algorists. By 1500 algorithmic computing had won 
supremacy and in another hundred years the abacists were almost forgotten, whilst by the 
eighteenth century no trace of an abacus was found in western Europe (Eves 1983). The 
algorithm ban of the middle ages could be considered an analogy of current debates about 
how technology embedded algorithms (i.e. coding or programming languages) embody 
biopolitics through their capacity for panopticon surveillance in both macroscale online 
networks and nanoscale robotic biomedical systems. In all of these, algorithms lay hidden 
through automated procedures and can be set to observe, analyse and govern individual 
movements, acts, behaviours and preferences.5  
In Edun, banning mathematics becomes a governing mechanism for citizens. It is 
rooted in discourses that frame the need of a return to a common-sense state where 
people are liberated from competences in number, logic or reason. In our times 
mathematics as a matter of global curricular learning has been imposed as key for 
                                                
 
 
5 Self-assembly is the process in which small components automatically assemble themselves into large, complex structures. 
Examples in nature abound: lipids self-assemble to form a cell’s membrane, and bacteriophage virus proteins self-assemble to form a 
capsid that allows the virus to invade other bacteria. Even a phenomenon as simple as crystal formation is a process of self-assembly. 
How could such a process be described as “algorithmic?” The key word in the first sentence is automatically. Algorithms automate a 
series of simple computational tasks. Algorithmic self-assembly systems automate a series of simple growth tasks, in which the object 
being grown is simultaneously the machine controlling its own growth --The broad goal of nanoscience is to manipulate molecules 
with nanoscale precision. (Dotty, D. 2012. Theory of Algorithmic Self/Assemply: The challenge of programming molecules to 
manipulate themselves. Review article. Communications of the ACM. December 2012. Vol. 55. No. 12. 78/88). 
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governing the cosmopolitan citizen through logic, rationality, reason (Popkewitz 2008). 
The notions of governmentality and governing were coined by Foucault (2008) to expand 
the meaning of government to include not only political structures used directly to 
manage and administer, but also biopolitics enacted through the ‘conduct of conduct’; 
through the microphysics of power on individual human bodily practices. Paradoxically, 
one may note how such microphysics of power evolve for citizens both in Edun and in 
our times. In Le Guin’s story, the people of Edun say no to all modern and neoliberal 
monstrosities just by simply saying no to mathematics. First, they say no to the 
disciplining of the individual through school knowledge enclosures and, in particular, 
paradigms of order as authority, representation or individual rights (Foucault on 
disciplinary societies). And second, they say no to neoliberal fantasies in life that aim 
towards a total control of individual and collective moves through technologies that work 
implicitly at both macro and micro scales (Lazzarato on societies of control).  
Throughout the descriptions of life in Edun, one can detect discourses that hold 
mathematics as the heart of science and technology in both modernity and neoliberal 
societies, and therefore also hold it responsible for the burdens of a generalized crisis we 
face today. Specifically, in the modern age, science has been overused by political power 
to serve values of progress, development, expansion, invasion, welfare, security and 
world peace. The turbulent political scene in the US during the 60s, where Le Guin lived 
and wrote this story, revolved around fear and anxieties. This was due to the Vietnam war 
(also known as resistance war against America) from 1955 to 1975 and the Sputnik shock 
in 1957, due to the launch of a man-made satellite by the Soviets. The latter event 
essentially forced the US to make science a national priority. The US and the Soviet 
Union fights for dominance in science and math were related to ideas about progress and 
development. During that time, the tyrannies of Nazism, Fascism and Stalinism 
developed through the use of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ in the course of military, 
administrative and state power. The stage of horrors and catastrophes in Europe, Russia 
and the US created the impetus for new left political activists and social theorists to fight 
for democratic emancipation and freedom of speech. Additionally, labour struggles, civil 
rights, earth rights, gay rights, wo/men rights and sexual liberation came to the fore as 
social issues.  
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It was within this context that the ‘new math’ reform was introduced in the US 
with an emphasis on axiomatising, algorithmic computing and abstract reasoning. 
Although it has started as an academic mathematics project amongst a group of 
distinguished mathematicians in France, it was soon promoted in the US, just after the 
Sputnik shock, as a way to reform the mathematics education curriculum6. The new math 
influenced curricular reforms worldwide in the 60s and 70s in countries of the so-called 
developed world such as US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. The new math placed 
enormous emphasis on abstract operations and symbolic logic reconfiguring formal 
mathematics as the queen of disciplines. Opposition was eventually expressed by parents, 
teachers and educators who complained furiously about the void amongst new math 
curricular pressures for formal axiomatic thinking and people’s ordinary experiences – a 
debate that is still with us today as a gap amongst diverse mathematical practices (Kline 
1973, Walkerdine 1998).  
In the light of post-war events, historians and political philosophers from diverse 
left perspectives started discussing science, maths and ethics beyond the myth of a neutral 
or innocent practice. Modernity evolved around a generative belief in mathematical 
reason, scientific rationality and technological determinism through a blind dedication to 
the pursue of knowledge forming what Foucault called the ‘disciplinary societies’. 
Mathematical reason, in particular, was envisioned as the heart of any technoscientific 
endeavour and its violent use in political projects of development made it responsible and 
accountable for society’s calamity. Briefly, critical theorists attached to Frankfurt 
School’s legacy have moved the argument that reason as part of technological 
determinism was key in advancing industrial or capitalist regimes and thus limiting 
subject’s autonomy and freedom to resist oppressive authority (Adorno & Horkheimer 
1947:2002).  
                                                
 
 
6 The idea of ‘new-math’ was largely influenced by the Bourbaki group of mathematicians who progressed mathematics into a 
sophisticated axiomatisation based on set theory, symbolic logic, Boolean algebra etc. and aimed for higher levels of abstract 
mathematical thought. The ‘new math’ recontextualisation as school curriculum reform in the US was advanced as a means for 
preparing the young generation for mathematical reasoning. Readiness for abstract, symbolic and algorithmic thinking through 
reasoned argumentation procedures was seen as a vital skill in developing future generations who could compete Soviet scientists and 
especially nuclear engineers. 
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In his manuscript ‘One Dimensional Man’, Marcuse (1964) explained how the 
coupling of reason and freedom has declined in the late industrial epoch where the citizen 
as labourer and worker cannot even oppose the hegemonic domination imposed via 
techniques of ‘reason’ in the context of work as an increased economic, political and 
cultural concentration. In addition, ‘new left’ scholarship in the course of post-Marxist, 
post-structuralist or post-colonialist approaches have interrogated the discursive 
construction of certain ‘regimes of truth’ or ‘universals’ by means of pure reasoning. The 
perils of ‘reason’ in society have been explored by Foucauldian genealogies, but also by 
certain post/colonial or de/colonial critiques on how Eurocentric visions of ‘reason’ have 
been imposed onto the active, yet, for some, the ’wild’ life of indigenous or first citizens 
which are still rendered in tacit linguistic genres as under/developed, un/cultured or 
un/civilized (Spivak 1999). Walkerdine (1998) observes how the image of mathematics 
in society and schooling moved from a science of numerical calculation to a science of 
reason and reasoning that has influenced the formation of progressivism in mathematics 
education curricula and explains: “The powers of the mind were to be marshalled in order 
to govern a population through reason and the population would itself be developed 
enough to reason” (p. 30).  
The focus on mathematical reasoning in school mathematics curricular 
reformations is an integral part of discourses that help to develop a progressive society 
through the making of the desired reasoned and rational individuals. Reason has become 
an instrument of domination that not only persuades, organizes and administers, but also 
liquidates negativity and tames resistance in the context of oppression. The axis of 
political thought around Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze or Ranciere have initiated critiques 
of modernity in direct relation to scientific reason or rationality. However, they also open 
the limits of ‘critique’ for a new aesthetics of mathematics as multiplicity in ‘vitalism’ or 
‘vital power’ in Deleuze’s words (Deleuze 1988) or, perhaps, as a new ‘distribution of the 
sensual’ in Ranciere’s (Ranciere 2004). In sum, by narrating the ‘dis/appearance of 
maths’ in relation to ‘liberating life from reason’, Le Guin creates a space where the 
discourse of a sheer negativity around mathematical reason as key for the burdens of 
modernity reflects also an ambivalent move. This ambivalent move goes from what 
Foucault called ‘disciplinary societies’ rooted in the enclosures of family, school, factory, 
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hospital or prison towards their increased replacement by ‘societies of control’ based on 
governing mechanisms of which “the language [...] is numerical” (Deleuze 1990 p. 4) and 
where algorithm, code and password tend to replace word, text or signature. At present 
times, having to confront the monstrosities of religious fundamentalism, racism and 
secularization as a worldwide generalized crisis one might need to question what might 
be the effects in life for the citizen of an enforced dis/appearance of mathematical reason 
as enforced absence (disappearance) or/and as an arduous enforced presence that seems 
to appear with difficulty (dis-appearance).  
IV. But, what is life? And, could reason relate to the human condition of life? 
The question around the role of mathematics, mathematical subjectivity and life as bios 
(i.e. the life of citizen) in the state of Edun ravaged by the misuse of maths is crucial to 
Le Guin’s narrative. The Priests struggle to ’protect’ the mass population from using 
reason, logic or any forms of calculating devices by imposing a dictatorial ’state of 
exception’ through the law of mathematical prohibition. Lay people are obliged to live a 
common life and abstain from any pursuit of mathematical knowledge.  
In such ’society of control’ individual governing is accomplished through the 
affective politics of fear (Ahmed 2004) directed at the citizen bodies. Heretical 
mathematics practitioners experience their life as the bare life of ‘homo sacer’ − the 
person who looses the status of citizen − as they face the fear of death. Any suspected 
subject is closely tracked or becomes exiled, and this politics of fear become technologies 
of their exclusion as citizens (Ahmed 2004). The paradox of the novel is that politics of 
death or thanatopolitics in Esposito’s thinking, becomes an affirmative politics of life in 
Edun, bringing forth simultaneously its protection and negation (Campbell 2006). Death 
of the heretics along with fearing the deaf of mathematics did not work simply as a 
negation of mathematics but as a protection of its own life since it was geared towards a 
politics that mobilizes people into longing for a return to the light of a common-sense 
life. But, what is life in the first place? And, how could reason relate to life? 
Life, and life on earth, has been thoroughly discussed by Hannah Arendt as 
constituting the human condition of active life that evolves around three forms of activity: 
labour rooted in the biological process of the human body and life in earth, work which 
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corresponds to the making of objects and artefacts as a cycle of production and 
consumption, and action, or the political capacity to act on things that matter and 
“corresponds to our plurality as distinct individuals” (Arendt 1958:1998, p. ix). These 
activities are intimately connected with the core of human nature: birth and death, natality 
and mortality. Arendt writes about active life (vita activa) as partially separate from 
contemplative life (vita contemplativa) seen mainly through mainstream western 
philosophical thought as the activity of esoteric introspection in eternal structures and 
disassociated from life as lived collectively with others (Arendt 1958:1998). She explains 
how in modern age we have witnessed a celebration of a certain type of contemplative 
life where speculative reasoned thinking is overvalued at the expense of active life as 
labour, work and action.  
If social theorists and political philosophers who critique modernity have spoken 
so cruelly about the perils of ‘reason’ and the dangers of mathematical practice what is 
left for Arendt? Hannah Arendt in fact problematizes a thirst for introspection in vita 
contemplativa as “ancila theologiae” that becomes a goal on its own sake at the expense 
of vita activa (ibid., p. 292). Indeed, she brings forward the example of Adolf 
Eichmann’s inability to think. Labouring for the Nazis, he followed blindly ‘reason’ or, in 
fact, the ‘reasonable’ orders he had to obey wherein the evil of genocide lurked and made 
him one amongst the Nazi criminals. The Arendtian interrogation of such instances of 
contemplative thinking as ‘banality of evil’ resounds critiques on how ‘reason’ as ‘pure 
reason’ serves so eloquently to develop the language of modernity. However, Arendt 
rejects neither thinking nor scientific practice. On the contrary, she argues for the 
protection of thinking and science, maintaining that ‘reason’ is deeply weaved with the 
need to anew. In this, she agrees with Whitehead, who relates reason to novelty, saying 
how:  
The essence of Reason in its lowliest forms is its judgments upon flashes of novelty, of 
novelty in immediate realization and of novelty which is relevant to apparition but not yet 
to action. In the stabilized life there is no room for Reason. The methodology has sunk 
from the method of novelty into a method of repetition. Reason is the organ of emphasis 
upon novelty. It provides the judgment by which it passes into realization in purpose, and 
thence its realization in fact (Whitehead 1929, p. 10).  
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As such, the function of reason, not in stabilized life but in a life always thirsty for 
newness, might be a violent act – an act geared towards continuous innovation or novelty. 
Whitehead reminds us that reason can function in varied ways that sometimes can have 
dangerous effects either on people’s capacity to conduct other people, earth or animals, 
due to pressures to continually produce novelty at any cost. Addressing this issue might 
be a gesture towards disturbing the cycle of ’reasoning’ by means of its negation. As 
such, a return to common-sense life can work towards ’saving’ earth and society in 
response to the aftermaths of colonialism, modernism or neoliberalism. Arendt argues 
that the ‘victory of the Animal Laborans’ would not have been possible unless we had 
experienced extreme forms of violence based on well reasoned or seemingly reasonable 
obligations in ‘secular’ modern and colonialized societies (Arendt 1958:1998, p. 320). 
She explains that as we lose faith in modern values we tend to become deprived from the 
idea of an immortal life, a life that could always exist in the future as eternity by saying:  
Individual life again became mortal, as mortal as it had been in antiquity, and the world 
was even less stable, less permanent, and hence less to be relied upon than it had been 
during the Christian era. Modern man, when he lost the certainty of a world to come, was 
thrown back upon himself and not upon his world; far from believing that the world might 
be potentially immortal, he was not even sure that it was real’ (Arendt 1958:1998, p. 320).  
Facing the loss of security that a vision of immortality begets, the animal 
laborans promise common-sense where mortality is vital to be celebrated as survival, joy 
or immediate happiness in the present.  
Le Guin tries to exemplify a return to a life as ‘animal laborans’ by crafting the 
state of Edun, purposefully called the land of the Common Day, as the place where life 
must be urgently liberated from reason and as the epoche that signifies a return to 
common-sense. But, the state of Edun paves out this return by a forceful law and even by 
paradigmatic death unfolding a discursive rationalisation of mathematical reason as the 
fearful evil. Le Guin, along with Arendt pleas for a return to common-sense so that 
people as ’animal laborans’ can engage in full fleshed bodily action grounded in life. 
Arendt reflects on the loss of common-sense or the human capacity to act with judgement 
as an endemic malady of crisis in our era: “The disappearance of common-sense 
nowadays is the most confident evidence of the current crisis. Part of the world is 
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destroyed in every crisis, something which is common to all of us” (Arendt 1958:1998, 
p. 227). In her political thought, the intellectual attitude of rational thinking becomes 
interrogated as being predominantly a modernist dream for creating citizenship ruled by 
the logic of production and consumption that alienates human beings from their shared 
world. Total adherence to ‘mathematical reason’ is critiqued as leading into technological 
determinism that produces societal horrors and catastrophes by disciplining the 
reasonable subject. But, at the same time, she problematizes a common-sense life without 
reason. She questions labour and work that refrain from reason as thoughtful judgement 
entwined in what is common-sense for her, as well as, a sightless turn into an ‘automatic 
functioning’ of governing practices witnessed in contemporaneous ‘societies of control’:  
“The last stage of the laboring society, the society of jobholders, demands of its members a 
sheer automatic functioning, as though individual life has actually been submerged in the 
over-all life process of the species and the only active decision still required of the 
individual were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his individuality, the still individually 
sensed pain and trouble of living, and acquiesce in a dazed, ‘tranquilized’, functional type 
of behaviour.” (ibid., p. 322). 
Le Guin narrates the dystopic land of disappearing mathematics as a ‘state of 
emergency’ where the law of ‘mathematical prohibition’ must protect people from the 
perils of ‘reason’ by negating reason itself. People must return to a common life. As 
already said, mathematical prohibition was exerted at varied layers constituting life at 
Edun. One could be found guilty if caught into any sort of mathematical activity, or, 
even, related to people who were suspects of any type of engagement with mathematical 
tasks. Disobedience to the law of ‘mathematics prohibition’ was perceived as heresy. 
People were closely censored at the level of their every day encounters, interrogating not 
only how people speak and act, but also how they move, gesture, behave and relate with 
the ‘other’. This can be described as a ‘repressive turn’ of a ruthless “authoritarianism for 
the masses” (Lazzarato 2011, p. 85). Under the threat of harsh laws and measures that 
forbid mathematical reason dictated by the oligarchy of Priests in Edun, the fabrication of 
the ‘pure’ or even the ‘common’ subject cleared from the sin of mathematics becomes a 
catalyst for the production not of the free or autonomous subjects, but the self-disciplined 
or self-regulated, and yet disconnected and subdued citizen. One can note how Le Guin 
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manages with her story to problematize a return to this much needed common-sense in 
the complete absence or loss of reason. By exposing on the one hand the perils of a blind 
resonance to mathematical reason and on the other hand the threats of a total disdain from 
reason she makes us confront this antinomy as a contradiction amongst inferences upon 
not easily resolvable conflict. In addition, by provoking her readers to imagine a land 
where mathematics becomes forbidden in the context of an austere sovereign power 
producing ‘bare life’ that even leads to thanatopolitics, she urges us to consider also the 
repression of reason not as the ban of mathematics per se, but as a dispositif where the 
politics of life, biopower and common-sense are assembled as entangled elements.  
V. Mathematical Heterotopias: Or, reason as the anarchic ‘art of life’ 
“By twilight of that cold Alterday they had gone as far as Mede could take Ganil. Indeed 
Ganil had gone further than Mede could follow him.  
Mede: ’You must meet Yin’, the fair man said. ’He can teach what you need. Yin works 
with angles, triangles, measurements. He can measure the distance between any two 
points, points you can’t reach, using his triangles. He is a great Learner. Numbers 
are the heart of his knowledge, the language of it’ 
Ganil: And my own language. 
Mede: Yes, it is. Not mine. I don’t love numbers for themselves. I want to use them. To 
explain things… For instance, if you throw a ball, what makes the ball move?” 
-Ursula Le Guin, The Masters, p. 49 
Mathematical prohibition in Edun has been constructed as a total necessity, as 
reason is seen as responsible for earth’s decay. Nature in Edun is pictured as the verge of 
environmental catastrophe, as Sun and Light have become rare and are worshipped as 
mythical gods. Le Guin describes how one day, when the sun came out, “a soft 
tremendous murmur rose up from the streets, squares, windows, roofs, walls of the city of 
Edun”, and people cried “Heaven, heaven…” (p. 52). In this atmosphere of severe 
environmental crisis, mathematical prohibition becomes the tool for saving earth and 
human life by allowing people to live a common-sense life. However, life at Edun, called 
the land of the Common Day, becomes impossible for those who cannot tolerate the 
encumbrances of mathematical repression. Mathematical repression meant suppressing 
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the subject’s freedom to knowledge and was experienced as an intolerable, agonizing and 
distressing enslavement. For example, Ganil, the newly initiated Master, cannot tolerate 
how young apprentices, such as Wanno, are not allowed to learn new ways of calculating 
or measuring, and are thus restricted to tedious memorization of tables.  
The lightness of a common-sense life stemming from such forceful disappearance 
of mathematics becomes, paradoxically, an unendurably heavy weight. Inspired by Milan 
Kundera’s well-known novel7, Hagedorn (2015) discusses the “unbearable gravity of 
being” (p. 54) by pointing out how Nietzsche considers mortality and indeed, death, in 
his ’Birth of Tragedy’ as important of being able “to live and even to live happily” 
(p. 54). Nietzsche (1999), discussing the essence of a human being, refers to Greek 
tragedy where the ephemeral and wretched race of the human being is destined to death 
and urges us to consider that: “the second best thing for you is: to die soon” (p. 23) whilst 
“the very first thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, not to be, to be 
nothing” (p. 23). It is exactly within this ephemeral character of human life that a creative 
world can or must be built that brings joy instead of despair at the loss of life, according 
to Silenus’s wise words8. Based on Nietzsche’s analysis, Hagedorn (2015) argues how 
“out of an urgent need to make life bearable the Greeks created the magic mountain of 
the joyful Olympians” (p. 55). Could we dare say that Ganil, Mede, Yin and the 
necromancers in Edun opt to create their mathematical heterotopia as a way to face their 
mortality? 
We see how Ganil, Mede, Yin and others opted to perform mathematics in 
secrecy, placing their lives at jeopardy. Ultimately, Ganil meets additional friends who 
were forming secret mathematics in disguise. Being illegal, mathematics lurked 
everywhere9 in wherever lay people, prentices, Masters or Priests could find opportunities 
to practice it. Once Ganil made friends with Mede, his co-Master in the Lodge, he shared 
his passion for mathematics. Soon Mede, Ganil, Yin and others were regularly meeting in 
                                                
 
 
7 Milan Kundera’s novel ’The Unbearable Lightness of Being’ appeared first in French in 1984 and then in the Czech in 1985, but it 
took until 2006 before the Czech Republic published the book. The novel narrates the political struggles of the Prague Spring of 1968 
through the lives of three lovers, discussing totalitarianism, moral obligation, freedom, love and liberation.  
8 Silenus was a companion of Dionysus and described this world after King Midas caught him (see Hagedorn 2015, p. 54-55). 
9 Foucault arrives at a similar observation when discussing sexual repression. He notes that when sex was constructed as illegal or 
dangerous its presence and popularity could be detected everywhere making it illegal, forbidden, but yet desired. 
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secret and practiced in their mathematical heterotopia in agonizing despair; seeking to 
create the conditions that would allow them autonomy in what they desired to do. The 
secret gatherings amongst Mede, Ganil, Yin and others were not simply an escape from 
enslavement, but a return to freedom of being and realizing their mortality. Amidst 
ruthless sovereign conditions and environmental calamity, their desire in mathematics 
grew deeper.  
They regularly met covertly, particularly with Yin, an old necromancer who had 
been suspect of math heresy and kept in custody. There, before the fire at Yin’s house, 
they could disclose and explore cosmic mysteries and contemplate enigmatic or 
perplexing questions such as ‘what is the sun?’, ‘what is its shape?’, ‘is it a circle, or a 
sphere?’, ‘how big is it?’. However, this joy and pleasure in seeking knowledge together 
could, at the same time, put their own life at risk in the face of a society governed by a 
sovereign power in the name of crisis10. A crisis that exposes the ‘unbearable lightness of 
being’ as discussed by Milan Kundera and which according to Ludger Hagedorn (2015) 
is today “the secret shibboleth of the post-modern globalised world” (p. 49). Hagedorn 
eloquently discusses current conditions of ‘being’ in which our commitment to each other 
is superseded by a flexible, non-binding mode of life. Against this tendency, Ganil’s 
heterotopia of learners and necromancers pursues maths as a way to interrogate the 
‘lightness of Being’. Such a response could be read as resistance to state-imposed 
mathematical repression, but, at the same time, it could be read as a response to life itself 
(Arendt 1958:1998) that could reshape and sustain their socially grounded mathematical 
subjectivity. Foucault − in the History of Sexuality − describes how sexual repression 
leads to displacement, reorientation and intensification of desire and ultimately the 
production of heterotopias that produce and distribute knowledge, induce pleasure and 
generate power relations. Their mathematical heterotopia was a place where the practice 
of reason afforded them an anarchic act of life.  
Le Guin’s utopian politics is often discussed in relation to anarchist freedom. 
Both Le Guin and anarchism attempt to move beyond the dipole of modern and 
                                                
 
 
10 Discourses around crisis in society and crisis in education have been seen as recurring and interacting phenomena, always part of 
broader net of politics of power and regimes of totalitarianism or democracy within society (see Arendt 1953 about the crisis in 
education). 
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postmodern epochs in search of new collectivities and new stances toward science or 
nature. Whitehead, discussing the function of reason in an essay published in 1929, 
argues that it is anarchic: ‘Reason is the self-discipline of the originate element in history. 
Apart from the operations of Reason, this element is anarchic’ (p. xx) Although 
Whitehead’s approach to ‘history’ is through the eventful timescape of nature’s decay as 
‘degradation of energy’ or a waste of matter he emphasizes its engendered genesis 
‘exemplified by the yearly renewal of nature in the spring, and by the upward course of 
biological evolution’. Within such perspective of history, where nature itself is woven 
with ‘natality’ in Arend’s words or regeneration in Haraway’s, one may apply ‘reason’ to 
reach into the wildest questionings of life itself. Or, even, one may use reason to escape a 
life that becomes repressive, oppressive or precarious – a bare life lived as a state of 
exception. And it is exactly the confrontation of such a precarious bare life that make 
some people in Edun seek and create heterotopias. There, they can be, albeit temporarily, 
free.  
Considering that an attempt to determine the potential function of ‘reason’ can 
take a long philosophical journey full of controversies in-between on the one hand reason 
and on the other hand faith, authority, intuition, critique, imagination, agency, purpose, 
syllogism, argument, rationalism, empiricism amongst scopes of mental experience.11 
Instead, Whitehead searches Reason in direct relation to animal adaptation in nature and 
maintains how we need to hold on two contrasted forms of considering reason: “Reason 
as seeking a complete understanding and Reason as seeking an immediate method of 
action” (p. 11) arguing how these two forms must be coordinated. He further explains 
that reason as abstraction focuses on complete understandings given by a godlike faculty 
above the world, whilst the pursue of reason as process emphasizes the operation of 
judgements within messy worlds. He continues stressing: “The Greeks have bequeathed 
to us two figures, whose real or mythical lives conform to these two notions –Plato and 
                                                
 
 
11 Historically, reason, with roots in the philosophical traditions of Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece but also in the narratives of 
Homer in Ulysses, became an episteme based on exploring rigorous argumentation and logic for the pursue of ’true’. In Enlightment, 
rationalists such as Descartes (1596-1650) emphasized reason as a deductive intellectual endeavour, empiricists such as Newton 
(1642-1727) favoured induction as the need to ground hypothesis into natural observations, whilst Leibniz (1646-1715) focused 
towards formulating a universal rational language for reasoning emphasizing symbolic logic at the expense of sensory experience 
(Toulmin, 2003, Whitehead, 1929).  
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Ulysses. The one shares Reason with the Gods, the other shares it with the foxes” (pp. 9-
10). Yet, Whitehead asserts that amidst all these, the ultimate function of reason must be 
to “…promote the art of life” and his argument evolves by questioning the mere 
application of reason for ‘the survival of the fittest’ claiming that ‘fitness for survival’ 
alone12 is not a satisfactory exemplification of the Art of Life (p. 4). One may wonder if 
we could, perhaps, turn into a similar path of inquiring for an art of life in mathematics 
education practices. 
VI: Is it, really, about mathematics?  
‘The Masters’ narrates life in Edun, a place of severe environmental crisis. Here, 
sovereign power penetrates the body, tracing its ‘bare life’ through the totalitarian 
mathematical ban. People are closely tracked and controlled and thus governed by means 
of this canon, and if found disobedient, they are announced heretics, sent to court and 
condemned to death. As science fiction stories are popular, particular amongst youth, it is 
important to ask how mathematical subjectivities are crafted in science fiction, and how 
these mathematical subjectivities relate to forms of life, governing power mechanisms 
and discourses of environmental and societal crisis. Still, this short story might have a 
particular value for researchers in the field of mathematics education concerned about its 
symptoms and disorders. The story encourages us to revisit the dichotomous moves of a 
pendulum across the poles of the ‘maths for all’ and ‘no to maths’. What we may 
consider through Le Guin is that the urgency of an absolute ‘yes’ to mathematics for all 
in mathematics education research is part of a broader assemblage of institutions, such as 
schooling, pedagogical models, national and international assessments, competitions, 
market products and even leisure sites. As such, it becomes part of a complex net of 
discursive and corporeal power relations.  
In reaction to this, a turn to a ‘no’ to mathematics - enforced as math repression to 
all - could be seen as a temporality that both invites a return to a common-sense life and 
                                                
 
 
12 Loyalty to reason has been key for enculturating the civilized subject freed from the chaotic mysteries of reality and the 
superstitious spirit in feudalism of mediaval Europe. For Modernity’s project, mathematical reason was celebrated, at the expense of 
intuition and senses, for orienting life away from the uncertain grounds of tradition and religion beliefs. Reason became key for 
producing a world construed around the values of rationality, progress and development, and mediated the construction of ‘machinery’ 
technologies and administrative strategies, and thus, served to change drastically work and labor (Kant 1781:1998). 
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produces the homo sacer. With Agamben and Esposito we see how both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to 
mathematics can be seen as governing mechanisms or technologies of self imposed by 
totalitarian regimes producing inclusions and exclusions. For Agamben, biopolitics in 
western thinking, from the Aristotelian notion of man as ‘political animal’ until now is 
covert sovereignty as power over life. This has been evident in mathematics education 
practices that produce the mathematically disabled subject as unskilled, incompetent or 
unfit in a society that strives for progress, as well as the mathematically able subject as 
fearful, dangerous or disenchanted from a common-sense life. It is in such cases that 
individuals turn to heterotopic spaces of mathematical activity which, according to 
Esposito, provide the affirmative politics that protect and create life anew.  
However, Le Guin also reminds us that a safe return to a ‘common-sense’ life, 
cleared from all burdens of savage, enlightened, cultured, colonial, modern, disciplinary 
or even control societies was never and can never be an easy path. In other words, whilst 
‘maths for all’ normalizes citizens through the ideal of mathematical reason, a ‘no to 
maths’ produces citizens who fear to reason for themselves. Fear of mathematics may 
lead some to a complete lack of resorting to reason (i.e. mathematics repression), 
especially since reason becomes more and more embedded and hidden into scientific and 
technological developments. We come to appreciate that the repressive aspects of state 
power cannot produce subjects freed or liberated from the powers of reason. Arendt 
argues for reason as grounded in common-sense, and, similarly, Whitehead speaks of 
bodily reason that does not serve the survival of the fittest or a complete universal 
understanding of nature, but rather serves common good. This reminds of Haraway’s 
claim that we have no alternative but ‘staying with the trouble’ (p. 58) caused by perils 
and demands in our turbulent epoch and search for ways of ‘sympoiesis’ and 
‘symbiogenesis’ (p. 58) or making-with as ‘nothing makes itself; nothing is really 
autopoietic or self-organising’ (p. 58). We have no alternative but to live-with, think-with 
and become-with others exploring potentialities of rebirth, natality and regeneration. Is 
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